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A. Introduction 
It is becoming all too clear that, 
unless radical steps are taken, we are 
in danger of maiming our environment 
and many of its nonhuman inhabitants 
beyond recognition. The problems 
res u Iti ng from poll ution, depletion of 
the earth's resources, and economic 
development at the expense of land, 
ai r, and water grow increasi ngly 
severe. Animals are being. deprived 
of their habitats, and species are 
becoming endangered or extinct at an 
alarming rate. It is imperative that 
we change our environmental policies. 
Effective policy changes require a 
coherent ethical basis, however, and 
environmentalists thus far have not 
been noted for their philosophical 
unity. Many different positions have 
been taken, from the allegedly "mod­
erate" attitude of a William Ruckel­
shaus, to the advocacy of ecological 
sabotage by "Earth First," a group 
inspired by a novel (Edward Abbey's 
The Monkey Wrench Gang) in which 
machines are trashed, bridges blown 
up, and human life treated cavalierly 
at best. 1 Ecologist Garrett Hardin 
quite seriously proposes that wilder­
ness areas contain no emergency roads 
and that backpackers who get 
stranded fi nd thei r own way out or 
die (to bring in helicopters would 
defile the serene beauty of the sur­
roundings).2 The diversity of envi­
ronmentalist views, many of them with 
unpalatable consequences to most 
humans, has made environmentalism an 
easy ta rget for its detractors. 
A coherent envi ronmental eth ic is 
necessa ry for the resol ution of th is 
situation. But how can such an ethic 
be formulated and what would its 
implications be for human and nonhu­
man animals? Are those implications 
morally defensible? I will not attempt 
to give a comprehensive treatment of 
all the issues that have been raised 
by the growing literature on environ­
mental ethics. Rather,', will consider 
the two major rival conceptions of an 
environmental ethic which are emerg­
ing from the literature: individualism 
and holism. I will sketch what I take 
the implications of each for humans 
and nonhumans to be, then discuss 
important objections to each view. I 
wi II a rgue that the individual istic con­
ception has more to recommend it from 
the moral point of view. However, 
the holistic approach has merit also, 
and I will try to show that an ade­
quate environmental ethic should con­
tain elements from both conceptions. 
B. Preliminary Distinctions 
I will begin with some necessary 
distinctions. By 'ethic' I mean a com­
prehensive, coherent set of principles 
of value and obligation. Of the two 
types of principles, those concerning 
value are more fundamental. The 
moral rightness of an act depends, 
wholly or in part, on whether it pro­
motes that which is intrinsically 
valuable; i. e., val uable for its own 
sake. Beings are intrinsically valua­
ble to the extent to wh ich they poss­
ess certain properties. Just which 
properties those a re must be deter­
mined by an ethic's theory of value. 
Some candidates are: having the 
capacity to experience pleasu re or 
happiness; having the capacity for 
knowledge; having the capacity for 
freedom; beauty, harmony, health, 
a nd life. Such properties, a nd the 
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events or states of affa irs wh ich 
exemplify them, are morally relevant 
according to an ethic, but only beings 
can be said to have moral standing or 
to be morally considerable. Because 
of the properties certain beings have, 
we are obligated to consider how they 
would be affected by a given action or 
policy. Morally considerable beings 
are valuable in their own right. It 
follows that it wou Id be wrong to treat 
them as instrumentally valuable only; 
i.e., as mere instruments for the pro­
duction of other value. 3 An ethic 
must determine which beings are to 
count as morally considerable, and it 
must do so on the basis of morally 
relevant characteristics. It must also 
arrive at a nonarbitrary criterion of 
moral significance which will allow for 
the resol ution of confl icts among mor­
ally considerable beings. 
An ethic is environmental if and 
only if it accords moral standing to 
some non sentient beings. 4 Some 
plants, natural objects, or systems 
must cou nt as bei ng val uable in thei r 
own right. An ethic which classifies 
all such beings as merely instrumen­
tally valuable would be, in Tom 
Regan's words, an ethic " for the use 
of the envi ronment," 5 not an envi ron­
mental ethic. An environmental ethic 
is not a narrowly focused set of prin­
ciples pertaining only to what we call 
"environmental issues." It will have 
implications for all beings with moral 
standing, whoever or whatever they 
may be. 
What beings have moral standing? 
According to the individualistic con­
ception of an environmental ethic, 
on Iy i ndivid ual entities (hereafter, 
simply 'individuals') can be morally 
considerable, be they humans, non hu­
man animals, or redwoods. On such a 
view, ecosystems and species have no 
mora I sta nd i ng. Accord ing to the 
holistic conception of an environmental 
ethic, it is complex systems of indi­
viduals ('beings' in a broad sense of 
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the term) which have moral standing: 
i nd iv id uaIs ass uc h hav e non e . I wi II 
refer to these views as envi ronmental 
individualism and environmental ho­
lism, respectively. 
How is one to evaluate these two 
conceptions of an environmental ethic? 
How can one determine whether either 
is more justifiable than a more tradi­
tonal ethic for the use of the environ­
ment? It would be impossible to dis­
cuss the vast literature on the 
meaning and justification of ethical 
views here, so I will simply offer a 
proposal which most contemporary 
eth ical theorists accept. Whatever it 
may mean to say that a human, fox, 
lake or species is intrinsically valua­
ble, it is plain that one's judgment 
must meet some minimal criteria. If 
one's judgment is (1) not informed 
about the relevant facts, including the 
information one gains about sentient 
beings through empathy, or (2) is not 
clearly thought out, or (3) is not 
impartial, or (4) is not universaliza­
ble, then that judgment is not justi­
fied. Conversely, if a judgment· of 
intrinsic value meets all these condi­
tions, it is as justified as an ethical 
judgment can ever be: it is well-con­
sidered. Therefore, the ethics in 
question will be tested by taking the 
moral point of view: we will· try to 
determi ne whether they stand up to 
clear, informed, impartial scrutiny 
when universaliz·ed. We can call this 
an appeal to those famous "ethical 
intuitions," provided we never forget 
that those i ntu itions must be well-con­
sidered. An appeal to such intuitions 
is not to be confused with an appeal 
to simplistic moral biases. Those phi­
losophers who attack the method of 
appealing to intuitions are really just 
objecting to the latter practice. G 
C. The Failure of the
 
Homocentric Eth ic
 
Before tu rn i ng to envi ronmental 
individualism and holism, \et us 
112 
briefly consider their traditional rival: 
the homocentric ethic. According to 
it, all and only human beings have 
moral standing. Nonhuman animals, 
plants, or natural objects have value 
only in so far as they serve human 
interests. The chief theoretical defect 
of the homocentric ethic is the arbi­
trary natu re of its criterion of moral 
considerability. To exclude from the 
realm of moral considerability those 
nonhuman animals who differ from 
(some) humans in no respect other 
than species-membership is to be 
guilty of a kind of thinking akin to 
racism, as Peter Singer has argued. 7 
Apart from this devastating defect, 
moreover, the homocentric ethic fails 
to accord with ou r considered views 
about envi ronmental preservation. It 
is, of course, true that enlightened, 
long- range homo-sapiens-interest 
would justify many environmentally 
sound policies: e.g., the halting of 
fu rther depletion of the ozone layer 
by fl uoroca rbon s, th e red uction of 
other air, land, and water pollution 
that harms humans, and the safer 
disposition of toxic wastes. Surely we 
cou Id improve upon some of ou r cu r­
rent "caretakers" who, believing that 
the Second Coming is at hand, think 
there will be no future generations to 
benefit from a clean envi ronment. 
Nevertheless, the homocentric eth ic 
cannot go far enough. Its fatal flaw, 
as Eric Katz has argued, is its making 
envi ronmental preservation conti ngent 
on human attitudes: 
Basing arguments for environ­
mental preservation on the 
premises of utilitarian moral 
theory will only reveal the 
precarious relationship which 
ex ists between the sati sfaction 
of human needs and the pres­
ervation of natural objects. 8 
There are many species of animals and 
plants which few humans value, whose 
extinction would not harm us: e.g., 
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s na iI-da rters, d us ky-footed wood rats, 
the furbish lousewort (an unassuming 
and rare little plant), and perhaps 
even the timber wolf. 9 As the case of 
the Tellico Dam shows, elimination of 
some species may result from policies 
which benefit humans economically and 
recreationally. (Fortunately for the 
snail-darters, they have another habi­
tat which is as yet uncoveted by 
humans.) Human interests might be 
better satisfied if we reduced the 
number of animal species, putting 
thei r former habitats to economically 
better use. Why not follow the gen­
eral policy which we see pursued in 
Borneo, where orangutans are losing 
thei r forest homes to fa rms? We cou Id 
save cute, cuddly, and bizarre repre­
sentatives of some of these species for 
display in zoos, where they are so 
much easier to see and enjoy. Turn­
ing to some non sentient parts of our 
envi ronment, we have al ready seen 
the sh ri n kage of the amou nt of parks 
and wilderness areas in the public 
domain. Those that remain are often 
polluted (from an environmentalist 
point of view) by superhighways, 
motels, restaurants, laundromats, 
motorcycles, motorboats, snowmobiles 
and land-rovers. Far too many areas 
have been "Yosemitized." Yet, these 
measures may well have resulted in a 
greater amount of human satisfaction. 
For every furious Sierra Club mem­
ber, there a re many contented tou­
rists. 
Moreover, it might be very benefi­
cial from a homocentric point of view 
to alter some envi ronmental attitudes 
which many people still have. Martin 
Krieger, in an article in Science called 
"What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?," 
a rgues that 
the demand for ra re envi ron­
ments is a learned one. It 
also seems likely that conscious 
public choice can manipulate 
this learning so that the envi­
ronments which people learn to 
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use and want reflect environ­
ments that a re likely to be 
available at low cost ... What's 
wrong with plastic trees? My 
guess is that there is very lit­
tle wrong .with them. Much 
more can be done with plastic 
trees and the like to give most 
people. the feeling that they 
are experiencing nature. 10 
Would it even be all that difficult to 
change people's attitudes in this 
direction? Plastic flowers and artifi­
cial house plants are already favored 
by many, as are fake-animal lawn 
ornaments. Why not put astrotu rf 
under the ceramic deer, chicks, bun­
nies, and flamingoes? Many people 
already find the charms of mechanical 
beasts in the wilds of Disneyland 
much more appealing than those of 
thei r less entertai ni ng natu ra I cou nt­
erparts. We would not need to make 
the special, costly efforts which pres­
ervation of rare environments and wild 
animals call for if most people became 
satisfied with cheap replacements. 
It is evident that the homocentric 
eth ic ma kes the envi ronment, as well 
as individual animals, hostage to the 
interests which humans happen to 
have. These interests frequently run 
counter to environmental preservation. 
I maintain that reflection about our 
"Yosemitized" parks and the prospect 
of environmental plastification shows 
this implication to be unacceptable. 
Since it does not accord with our con­
sidered view, the homocentric eth ic 
fails to be an adequate ethic for the 
use of the environment. 
D. Environmental Individualism 
Let us see whether environmental 
individualism is an improvement on the 
homocentric eth ic. Some recent p ro­
ponents of this view have been Chris­
topher Stone,ll Tom Regan,12 and 
Donald Scherer. 13 Environmental indi­
vidualism accords moral standing to 
humans, sentient nonhuman animals, 
and some plants and natural objects. 
This ethic has two chief advantages 
over a homocentric ethic. First, it 
does not accord moral standing on the 
basis of a morally irrelevant charac­
teristic: species. It is in agreement 
with the considered view that sentient 
nonhuman animals have value in their 
own right, that they a re not to be 
regarded as mere instruments for 
huma n gratification. Second, such a 
view impl ies that extensive exploita­
tion, poll ution, and plastification of 
the envi ronment is wrong, even if it 
cou Id be done without ha rmi ng the 
chances for human survival and 
enjoyment. This too, I maintain, 
agrees with our considered views. 
Environmental individualism makes nei­
ther nonhuman animals nor wilderness 
areas hostage to the preferences peo­
ple happen to have. Thus, it is 
superior from the moral point of view 
to the homocentric ethic. However, 
severa I serious objections have been 
pressed against environmental individ­
ualism. Let us consider each in turn. 
1. Holists have charged that envi­
ronmental individualism is objection­
ably atomistic. E.g., Alistair Gunn 
argues that 
[Holistic] environmentalism 
seems incompatible with the 
'Western' obsession with indi­
vidualism, which leads us to 
resolve questions about ou r 
treatment of animals by appeal­
ing to the essentially atomistic, 
competitive notion., of 
rights ... 14 
The same objection is made more fully 
by Kenneth Goodpaster, in a fre­
quently cited article critical of indi­
vidualism in ethics: 
I am convi nced that the mere 
en la rgement of the class of 
morally considerable beings is. 
an inadequate substitute for a 
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genuine environmental ethic. 
the oft- repeated plea by 
some ecologists and environ­
mentalists that our thinking 
needs to be less atomistic and 
more 'holistic' translates into a 
plea for a more embraci ng 
object of moral consideration. 
I n a sense, it represents a 
plea to retu rn to the richer 
Greek conception of a man by 
nature social and not intelligi­
bly removable from his social 
and political context-though it 
goes beyond the Greek concep­
tion in emphasizing that socie­
ties too need to be understood 
in a context, an ecological 
context, and that it is this 
la rger whole that is "the 
bearer of value. 1l15 
The objection is that any ethic which 
restricts moral standing to individu­
als, be they sentient or nonsentient, 
ignores the mutual dependencies of 
individuals and the larger ecological 
context which includes them. It is 
these large systems which are intrin­
sically valuable, not the individuals 
they include. 
I believe this objection to be dou­
bly mista ken. Fi rst, it attacks a 
"straw ethic. 11 No one who advocates 
an individualistic ethic, whether or 
not it includes non sentient beings, is 
unaware of the mutual dependencies of 
individuals and their reliance on land, 
air, and water for existence. Of 
course individuals do not exist in iso­
lation. To paraphrase John Donne, 
no lousewort "is an island unto itself. 
Second, it simply does not follow that 
if an individual is a member of a large 
complex whole, without which it could 
not exist, the whole rather than the 
individual must be "the bearer" of 
intrinsic value. Would we say that a 
child who is a member of a richly 
complex family unit thereby lacks all 
value in his own right, the family 
(not its members!) alone having 
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intrinsic value? The inference is a 
non sequitur. Thus environmental 
individualism survives .this objection. 
2. An objection has been raised 
against proponents of "animal libera­
ti 0 n " wh ich aIso ap p lies to en v i ro n ­
mental individualists. Views according 
to which sentient beings, regardless 
of their origins and special character­
istics, are morally considerable are 
sa id to confl ict with ou r considered 
intuitions that wild animals are of 
vastly greater value than domestic 
animals. J. Baird Callicott writes that 
there is "a sharp distinction between 
the very different plights (and 
rights) of wi Id and domestic ani­
mals. "16 He suggests that domestic 
animals have little or no moral stand­
ing: 
Domestic animals are creations 
of man~ They are living arti­
facts, but artifacts neverthe­
less, and they constitute yet 
another mode of extension of 
the works of man into the eco­
system. From the perspective 
of the land ethic a herd of 
cattle, sheep or pigs is as 
much or more a ruinous blight 
on the landscape as a fleet of 
fou r-wheel-d rive off the road 
veh icles. 17 
Domestic animals are said to be objec­
tionable human artifacts, having been 
"bred to docility, tractability, stupid­
ity and dependency."ls Wild animals, 
on the other hand, have much more 
admirable qualities, qualities without 
which they could not have survived. 
It is the latter, Callicott suggests," 
not the former, which our intuitions 
tell us arefit objects of our concern. 
They belong in the world in which 
they have naturally evolved; the 
pathetically unfit creatures of ou r own 
making do not. 
The inhumane treatment of 
pen ned domestics shou Id not 
 I . 
E&A IV/4 
be, I suggest, even discussed 
in the same context as whaling 
and wildlife traffic; it is a dis­
service to do so. 19 
In reply to this objection, it should 
fi rst be noted that envi ronmental indi­
vidual ism need not imply that domestic 
and wild animals have equal intrinsic 
value. To say that they are all mor­
ally considerable is not yet to say 
t hat they s h0 u Id be g iventhe same 
degree of moral consideration. To 
th ink otherwise is to confuse the cri­
terion of moral considerability with the 
criterion of moral significance. 2o Sec­
ond, it does indeed seem plausible 
that domestic andwil.d animals ought 
to be accorded different treatment, 
but the difference ought to be in 
favor of the domestic animals. 
Doesn't the manner in which wedelib­
erately created these creatu res 
increase rather than decrease ou r 
obligation to them? Consider the fol­
lowing parallel. We believe that we 
have special responsibilities to those 
humans whom we bring into existence 
in accordance with our culturally 
inculcated preferences for certain 
numbers and sex distributions of pro­
geny, at I,east unti I they are matu re. 
But whbt if we arranged it so that 
they did not reach maturity? Sup­
pose, a la Aldous Huxley, we used 
genetic engineering techniques to cre­
ate human beings who were deliber­
ately stunted into docile bovine idi­
ocy. We might save some pa rticularly 
attractive ones for pets, but most wi II 
be put to work. We train them to do 
the jobs not fit for intell igent sen si­
tive: humans, we use them for experi­
ments which will benefit us, often 
causing them agony, and we eat the 
tasty ones after subjecting them to 
factory-farming techniques that cause 
them great misery. (Dimwitted though 
they a re, they sti II have the capacity 
to suffer, as do domestic animals.) It 
seems to me that we wou Id owe these 
creatures a great deal, including 
moral consideration. From the moral 
lis 
p~int of view, the plight of OLi r 
stunted domestic humans is on all 
fou rs with the pi ig ht of ou r domestic 
animals. I can only conclude that we 
have greater, not lesser, moral obli­
gation s to these dependent "a rtifacts" 
than to thei r independent wi Id abori­
ginal progenitors. This conclusion 
squa res well with the envi ronmentalist 
view that wild animals ought not to be 
interfered with unless interference is 
required to restore a balance we ear­
lier disturbed. Thus, it seems that 
environmental individualism does not 
conflict with our considered views 
about domestic and wild animals after 
all. 
3; It has been objected that the 
extension of an ethic to include non­
human or non sentient individuals 
stretches ou r moral concepts out of all 
recbgn ition. Goodpaster puts this 
objection well: 
The "individualistic" model 
strains our moral sensitivities 
and intuitions to the breaking 
point, inviting talk of the 
"rights of animals, " from dol­
phins to mosquitoes; "rights," 
and even duties, of natu ral 
objects Ii ke trees and rivers; 
"chauvinism"; and court suits 
brought in the names of per­
sonified species or even his­
torical landmarks. 21 
I must co'nfess that I do not fi.nd tal k 
of animal rights to be counter-intui­
tive, provided the animals are sen­
tient, but the extension of such tal k 
to nonsentient bei ngs is another mat­
ter: One does indeed quail at the 
thought of carrying banners for 
rocks' rights and lousewort liberation. 
Does the Mississippi river have the 
rigoht not to have its cou rse altered 
by Louisiana civil engineers? Do red­
woods have duties to squ irrels? A 
view which has such implications is 
very suspect. Some versions of 
environmental individualism are open 
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to this objection. E.g., law professor 
Christopher Stone argues that "it is 
not unthinkable" to accord rights to 
natural objects like rivers, trees, and 
rocks, and he believes humans ought 
to rep resent those ri g hts in cou rts of 
law. 22 Why not "unthinkable?" 
Revealingly, Stone ties his view to a 
Whiteheadian idealism which accords 
consciousness to all natu ra I objects, 
including plants and rocks and even 
atoms. He even recommends that we 
regard the entire planet as a con­
sciou s entity. 23 
It is not clear whether Stone 
believes this to be true or is simply 
proposing it as a useful "myth. "24 If 
it is just a myth, and we have every 
reason to believe that it is, it can 
hardly justify any rights ascriptions 
to non sentient objects. To accord 
rights to rocks, at least, is to do 
violence to the concept of rights, a 
concept wh ich, as Joel Fei nberg has 
argued, entails that every rights­
holder has interests. 25 It makes 
sense to say that sentient bei ngs have 
interests, but what about nonsentient 
beings? In a very stretched sense of 
'interest,' we can attribute interests 
to, e.g., grass (it needs sun and 
water) . But then we can also say 
that lawnmowers have an interest in 
having their engines oiled and their 
blades sharpened. As Bryan Norton 
argues, if we base rights-ascriptions 
on such a watered-down concept of 
interests, they become enti rely a rbi­
trary.26 Thus objection (3) has con­
siderable force against views which 
ascribe rights to non sentient beings. 
However, envi ronmental individual­
ism need have no such implication. 
The concepts of 'having a right' and 
'being morally considerable' are not 
coextensive, as Goodpaster himself 
points out. 27 We may accord all sen­
tient beings rights (though not neces­
sarily the same rights) without 
accordi ng rights to nonsentient 
beings, while nevertheless regarding 
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some of the latter as being morally 
considerable. But at this point, the 
objection re-emerges: does not such 
a suggestion stretch ou r concept of 
moral considerability out of all recog­
nition?28 An excellent case can be 
made for the moral considerability of 
sentient individuals, who have inter­
ests ina nontrivial sense, but on 
what grounds can moral considerability 
be extended to plants and mountains? 
One possible reply is that whatever 
exists is, simply by virtue of its 
existence, morally considerable. If 
th is were the case, the enti re bu rden 
on envi ronmental individualism wou Id 
be shifted to its criterion of moral 
significance: all the "claims" of mor­
a II y con s ide r ablei nd iv id ua Is ( i . e. , 
eve rybody) wou Id have to be ra n k-0 r­
derd in a nonarbitrary way. Perhaps 
t his co u Id be do ne, but it is do ubtfu I 
that this challenge really must be met. 
For, how can existence be a morally 
relevant characteristic? Leaving aside 
the difficulty of whether it can be a 
cha racteristic at all, one wonders why 
existence as such should matter. One 
tends to shake one's head, with John 
Rodma n, at Zen masters who rega rd 
a II t h ingsasint r in sica \Iy val uab Ie,
29including smog. Short of adopting 
a theological perspective (which would 
yoke environmental individualism to 
some very questionable assumptions), 
it is hard to see how merely existing 
should entitle one to moral consider­
ability. Moreover, reflection about 
future generations suggests that exis­
tence may not even be necessary for 
such status. 
What, then, must the criterion of 
moral considerabi Iity be? If any 
beings are not to count as morally 
considerable, the exclusion must be 
based on morally relevant characteris­
tics. This problem must be solved' if 
environmental individualism is to be 
taken seriously. Rather than do an 
ex haustive su rvey of recent attempts 
to solve the problem and their 
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difficulties,3o I will offer a sugges­
tion. There are certain qualities 
which some naturally occurring non­
sentient individuals have which make 
them intri nsically val uable; e. g. , 
beauty, rna rvelous adaption to thei r 
environments, uniqueness, their con.;. 
tribution to the diversity on this 
planet. There is a whole cluster of 
aesthetic qual ities, one ot more of 
which are possessed by individuals 
such as the Grand Canyon, a redwood 
tree, a stone worn smooth by a river, 
a bee, and a specimen of furbish 
lousewort. (Sentient beings may have 
such qualities too, but these qualities 
are not the primary source of their 
moral considerability, as discussed 
above.) Beings which are intrinsi­
cally valuable in any of these ways 
ought to be taken into account when 
we make a moral decision, even if 
they are nonsentient. Just as we 
ought not wanton Iy to deface Miche­
langelo's Pi-eta, we ought not to make 
picn'ic tables out of a 2000-year-old 
living redwood. Careful, informed 
reflection about the redwood and even 
about the un remarkable but rare fu r­
bish lousewort will result in our admi­
ration and regard. Examples of 
bei ngs wh ich would not cou nt as bei ng 
morally considerable on these grounds 
are: a plant or nonsentient animal 
which, due to a disastrous mutation, 
has become unfit for su rvival, and 
has no other redeemi ng aesthetic 
qualities; a non sentient bei ng wh ich is 
not in the least ra re and has no other 
over-riding aesthetic value; most 
human junk, . such as plastic milk 
jugs; and smog. 
The appeal to values such as 
beauty, harmohY, diversity, and uni­
queness is hardly shockingly new: 
they have been on the lists of plural.;. 
istic value theorists since Plato's time. 
Only hedonists are apt to balk at 
them, and hedonism is a very dubious 
theory of value. What will disturb 
even non hedon ists, however, is the 
suggestion that such qualities have a 
place in an envi ronmental ethic. Is it 
not homocentric to grant beings moral 
considerability on aesthetic grounds? 
Are- we not making plants and natu­
rally occurring objects hostage to 
human aesthetic preferences in the 
same way in wh ich the homocentric 
ethic makes all nonhuman entities hos­
tage to human interests? 
This is a very serious objection, 
but I believe it can be handled. 
First, the hornocentricethic regards 
all nonhuman individuals, sentient or 
nonse'ntient, as instrumentally val uable 
only. They merely contribute. to 
intrinsically valuable human experi­
ences. Now, it is true that human 
aesthetic expetientes are intrinsically 
worthwhile, but the suggestion that 
nons-entient beings wh ich have certai n 
aesthetic qualities be morally consid­
erable entails that they are intrinsi­
cally valuable also. The aesthetic 
experiences we have are a response to 
these bei ngs, not the sou rce of thei r 
merelV i-nstrumental value. I believe 
reflection bears this out. Consider 
one's response to a strip-mined moun­
tain. Suppose that all the sentient 
life which th.at part of the mountain 
had supported has been moved to an 
even more congenial envi ronment. 
Apart from instrumental considerations 
(such as the economic benefits of the 
strip.;.mining), isn't one distressed at 
what has been done? It is not the 
loss of pleasurable aesthetic experi­
ences for present and future humans 
that we mourn, it is the muti lation of 
themou nta in. It is the object of our 
distress, not any missing experiences. 
Th us there is a crucial disanalogy 
between th is view and the homocentric 
ethic. 
But, it may now be objected, 
although it is true that envi ronmental 
individualis'm does not make human 
beings morally prior in the way the 
homocentri c eth ic does, are we not 
assigning moral considerability on a 
"-subJective," thus arbitrary, human 
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basis? Whatever non sentient beings 
humans happen to find aesthetically 
appealing make the cut, whereas oth­
ersdo not: they are hostage, so the 
objection goes, to human aesthetic 
preferences. A successful reply to 
this objection will have to draw the 
distinction between what merely seems 
to be aesthetically valuable and what 
is aesthetically valuable. Aesthetic 
judgments are no more subjective 
whims than are other value judgments. 
They must both receive the same test: 
they must be well-considered and as 
free from bias as possible. Certainly 
this is a very difficu It underta ki ng 
but then so is the making and testing 
of any value judgment. This is no 
ground for despair, but a challenge to 
work in the area of environmental 
aesthetics. 31 
I conclude that environmental indi­
vidualism has not been shown to 
stretch ou r concept of moral consider­
ability out of all recognition, although 
some versions of it do distort the 
concept of rights and thus ought to 
be rejected. 
The next objection focuses on the 
criterion of moral significance. It has 
been objected that environmental indi­
vidualism, by extending the range of 
the morally considerable to some 
plants and natural ·objects, leads to a 
virtually impossible task: the neces­
sity of resolving the many conflicting 
claims of humans, non human animals, 
plants, mountains, etc. This is the 
objection. which inspi red John Rod­
man's puzzled question: "My God, 
should we give 'America' back to the 
'Indians'. . or [to] the sumac?"32 
Several other philosophers have also 
raised this objection. 33 
One thing is clear: one cannot 
avoid the objection by decla ri ng that 
all morally considerable beings are 
equally valuable. Consider Albert 
Schweitzer's claim that 
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[The ethical man] does not ask 
how far this or that life 
deserves sympathy as valuable 
in itself, not how fa r it is 
capable of feeling. To him, 
life as such is sacred. 34 
Whom should one save: the human 
being or the anopheles mosquito? As 
Norton poi nts out, the res u It of such 
an ethic is moral paralysis. 3s Unless 
one were to resort to an inordinate 
amount of coin-tossing, inconsistency 
is the only answer for the moral agent 
who accepts this view. Schweitzer 
was quite admi rably inconsistent: he 
cut down jungle to build his hospital 
in central Africa and labored mightily 
against the interests of the anopheles 
mosquito. 36 
The religion of Jai n ism in I ndia has 
compa rable difficu Ities. The fi rst of 
five sacred vows which a Jain must 
make is "not to destroy life of any 
ki nd. " Followers go to heroic lengths 
to carry out the vow: e.g., they 
refuse to farm because plowing and 
harvesting kills innocent plants and 
insects; they don't walk in the dark 
for fear of murdering unseen grass 
and insects; thei r "s ky-clad" mon ks 
wear no clothes, refuse to bathe or 
brush their teeth (too many microbe 
lives would be wiped out by such 
action s), and wea r face-mas ks to p re­
vent thei r inadvertently swa Ilowi ng 
insects. They are lacto-vegetarians 
who eat on Iy plants wh ich are certifi­
ably dead (but not by murder! ) and 
who ins ist 0 n bo iii ng ( !) the i r mil k 
and water. Nevertheless, consistency 
with the first vow is forever impossi­
ble. Even those mon ks who choose to 
sta rve to death rather tha n conti nue 
destroying life destroy their own 
lives. 37 
The primary purpose of an ethic is 
to serve as an action guide for the 
achievement of certain worthy goals. 
If those goals can never be achieved, 
the action guide is a failure. In both 
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of the above reverence-for-life eth ics, 
th is is a di rect 'consequence of the 
refusal to adopt a criterion for moral 
significance. 
How then can confl icts be resolved 
by an envi ronmental individualist? 
Donald Scherer, whose own view is 
primarily individualistic,. suggests that 
"the way to deal with conflicts of 
positive val ues is th ree-fold: avoid 
them, dissolve them, or minimize 
them. "38 This is good advice, but in 
whose favor do we minimize unavoida­
ble conflicts? I think that a pLausible 
view would have to imply that bei ngs 
with interests (not in the stretched 
sense of 'interest' which applies to 
grass and lawnmowers), i. e., beings 
capable of having rights, should have 
preference over nonsentient entities, 
which, though they have moral stand­
ing, cannot plausibly be regarded as 
rights- holders. For the. l example, 
aesthetic value of a specimen of the 
hepatitis vi rus ,wh ich is rna rvelously 
well-adapted to its environment, is far 
outweighed by the death and suffering 
it and its fellows cause for sentient 
beings. Conflicts among rights-hold­
ers are more difficult to resolve, 
though this problem is hardly 
restricted to an environmental ethic. 
Iti s plausible to say, as Singer and 
Regan have argued, that we ought not 
to sacrifice significant interests of 
beings, such as life, freedom, and 
happiness, to the less significant 
interests of others, such as a liking 
for Kentucky-fried chicken. When 
there is an unavoidable clash of sig­
nificant interests, all the relevant 
factors in the case must be takeni nto 
aC.cou.nt and an impartial decision 
made. There can be no easy answers 
here, and one shQuJd be suspicious of 
a. vi.ew wh ich offers them. 
Th.e main point is this: if a very 
large number of bei ngs have moral 
standing, then we must work out a 
way of resolving conflicts among them, 
no m,atter how difficult this may be. 
To object to an ethic on the ground 
that it impl ies that there a re a vast 
number of conflicts to resolve is not 
to the point. Following this reason­
ing, an ethic with the smallest possi­
ble scope of moral considerability 
wou Id be the best. Fi rst-person ego­
ism ("an act is right if and only if it 
maximizes my long- range expectable 
utility") would w'in the competition 
hands down. Thus, as this reductio 
argument indicates, objection (4) 
against . envi ronmental individualism 
also fails. 
5. However, we now come to an 
objection which I do not think can be 
defeated. In the discussion of objec­
. tion (3) above, it was argued that 
certain aesthetic characteristics make 
some nonsentient individuals morally 
considerable (though they are insuffi­
cient, unlike the characteristic of 
sentience, to make them rights- hold­
ers). But this same line of reasoning 
leads to th.e concl usion that some 
richly complex wholes are intrinsically 
valuable too. A ca refu lIy balanc.ed 
ecosystem is beautiful in many 
respects. Even a very drab (at fi rst 
glance) wilderness area, such as the 
100 acres of California sage and chap­
pa ral wh ich Rodman fought to keep 
from being replaced by a golf 
course, 39 has harmony , stability, 
order, and variety. Whole systems of 
th is kind, incl udi ng thei r subsystems, 
have aesthetic value. They too, 
then; are morally considerable. The 
restriction of moral considerability to 
individuals is arbitrary. Therefore, 
although environmental indivi.dualism is 
vastly Jess arbitrary than the homo­
centric ethic, it too fails to be 
ad.equate ethic. It must either 
supplemented or replaced enti rely. 
an 
be 
E. Environmental Holism 
It is tempting at this point to 
escape to a replacement: environmen ­
tal .holism. According to it, individu­
als have instrumenta\ or derivative 
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value only: it is the richly complex 
wholes which include them' that are 
intrinsically valuable. Which richly 
complex wholes? The usual answer 
given is ecosystems. The classic 
statement of this view was given by 
Aldo Leopold, who called it "the land 
ethic": 
A thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the i nteg rity, sta­
bility, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when 
it tends otherwise. 40 
One may embrace a "global" holism, 
according to which the "fundmental 
bearer of value" is the entire ecosys­
tem on this planet, or one may accord 
moral considerability to smaller richly 
complex wholes such as wilderness 
areas. Whichever version of environ­
mental hoi ismone chooses, however, it 
wi II have the same impl ication for 
individuals: they have no value in 
their own right. 
Let us now tke a closer look at 
that implication. According to envi­
ronmental holism, individual members 
of a biotic community, however large 
that community might be, ought to be 
preserved only if they contribute fav­
orably to that community; if they 
detract from the community, they 
ought to be eliminated if possible. 
The implication holds for humans as 
well as nonhumans. If the biotic com­
munity would benefit, abortion, infan­
ticide, and ki II i ng of certa in ad u·lts 
would all be justified. Measures rou­
tinely taken with nonhuman animals 
would be extended justifiably to 
humans. Now, some might think it's 
high time that we take our turn. It's 
a short step from Ga rrett Ha rd in's 
proposal that we not try to rescue 
stranded backpackers in a wilderness 
area because "I have not lately heard 
that there is a shortage of people"41 
to the recommendation that the human 
population be "culled". At any rate, 
one certainly cannot accuse this view 
of homocentrism! 
What is the proper way for 
humans, as members of the biotic 
community, to live? According to 
environmental holism, they ought to 
interfere with natu ral processes as 
little as possible. In particular, they 
ought to resist subjecting the commu­
nity to "mechanico-chemical" manipula­
tion. The most eloquent spokesman 
for envi ronmental hoi ism, J. Bai rd 
Callicott, writes that: 
On the ethical question of what 
to eat, it answers, not vegeta­
bles instead of animals, but 
orga n ica lIy as opposed to 
mechanico-chemically produced 
food. Purists like Leopold 
prefer, in his expression, to 
get thei r "meat f rom God," 
i.e., to hunt and consume 
wildlife and to gather wild 
plant foods, and thus to live 
with i n the pa rameters of the 
aboriginal human ecological 
niche. Second best. is eating 
from one's own orcha rd, ga r­
den, henhouse, pig pen, and 
barnyard. Third best is buy­
ing or bartering organic goods 
from one's neighbors and 
friends. 42 
I have two principal objections to 
environmental holism. Each will be 
considered in turn. 
,. The distinction between 'natural' 
and 'artificial' implicit in the quote 
above is itself rather artificial. 
Human beings have evolved, through 
uncontroversially natu ral processes, 
into intelligent manipulators of their 
su rroundings. Not to employ these 
manipulative abilities would be unnat­
ural! Moreover, holists encourage 
some manipulation on our part. But it 
would surely be arbitrary to approve 
of a man's hunting with a bow and 
arrow while frowning on his use of a 
gun. ( Incidenta Ily, t have d ifficu Ity 
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seeing either practice as "getting meat 
from God": the animals do not exactly 
plummet from the heavens like 
manna.) As regards the disapproval 
of the "mechanico-chemical" produc­
tion: it is su rely true that we have 
done enormous damage to animals and 
the nonsentient envi ronment (not to 
mention ou rselves) with ou r ma nufac­
tured fertilizers, pesticides, and her­
bicides. But is it the "a rtificial ity" of 
these products that makes them objec­
tionable? Suppose we were able to 
produce cheaply and safely a ferti Iizer 
which exactly duplicates the proper­
ties of cow dung . What could possi­
bly be wrong with substituting it for 
the original? If we decide that we 
have been wrongfully exploiting cattle 
for our own convenience (and holists 
agree with animal liberations on this 
poi nt, thoug h for different reasons), 
and no longer breed them as we now 
do, wouldn't the invention ·of the 
pseudo-:cow~dung be sa luta ry rather 
than an objectionable human intrusion 
on nature? 
S:imilarly, suppose scientists learn 
to make superb vegetable-protein sub­
stitutes for chicken , beef, lamb, and 
veal at reasonable cost, substitutes 
which are indistinguishable from the 
originals and are not harmful to make 
or to eat. Untold numbers of animals 
would be spa red factory fa rmi ng, we 
cou Id humanely phas,e out the an imals 
we have domesticated for this pur­
pose, and no humans would have to 
endu re meat-taste withdrawal. Pre­
sumably, envi ronmental hoi ists 'would 
applaud the results of such an ,inven­
tion, but they would nevertheless 
condemn the "mechanico-chem+cal" 
nature of that invention . Surely this 
is misguided. The way to try to cor­
rect the damag-e we h·ave done is not 
to .abandon tech nology : by the 
hoJists' own reasoning, this would be 
an unnatu ral curta iIment of human 
,abilities. Instead, we oug,ht to employ 
our technology much more ~isely and 
sensitively. 
It is instructive to examine holistic 
criticism of a very insensitive use of 
technology: the mass production of 
chicken meat and eggs. Callicott con­
demns such factory-farming, but not 
because of the misery and death it 
inflicts on the chicken: 
From the perspective of the 
land ethic, the immoral aspect 
of the factory farm has to do 
fa r less with the sufferi ng .and 
killing of nonhuman animals 
than with the monstrous trans­
formation of living things from 
an organ,ic to a mechanical 
mode of being. 43 
It is true, as Callicott says, that we 
have come to treat these as mere 
machines. The chickens are no more 
than egg-assemblers and drumstick 
racks. Callicott sees this mechaniza­
tion as yet another intrusion of 
humans into natural processes: this is 
the source of his outrage. It seems 
tome, however, that one's outrage 
stems not from the use of technology 
on the fa rm as such, but from the 
effects of that particular tech nology 
on sentient beings. What clea rer 
indication ,could there be of our total 
lack of concer·n for the animals' inter­
ests? They have literally been tu rned 
into mere instruments for our gusta­
tory gratification. At least the barn­
ya rd ch icken is permitted some plea­
sant ,experiences before the Day of 
Reckoning! 
Here the environmental holist will 
prohably object that he is being 
attacked for be,inga holist,one who 
doesfl;ot ,re;g:ard +ndiv'idu a Is as intri n­
si'calil'¥i y valuable. :1 n order not to beg 
the question agai n-st hoi ism, I will 
p re.ssmyargurnent furthe;r in the 
second objection below. 
2 . The objection is th is. Envi ron­
menta'l holi'sm not regard the, ,aoe,s 
fear, suffering, and anguish of sen­
tient individuals, he they human or 
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nonhuman, as intrinsically bad, any­
more than it rega rds thei r pleasu re as 
intrinsically good. ,If the biotic com­
munity requires agonizing death, so 
be it. It will be a human obligation 
to inflict such death in sorne cases: 
not only by "getting meat from God," 
but by culling its own ranks. The 
resultant suffering and death is not a 
"necessary evil," according to holism: 
on Iy that wh ich ha rms the commu n ity 
is evil, just as only that which ben­
efits it is good. As Callicott points 
out: 
Pain and pleasu re seem to have 
noth i ng at aII to do with good 
and evil if our appraisal is 
taken from the vantage point 
of ecological biology. 44 
maintain that this implication is 
unacceptable from the moral point of 
view. One who clea rly, impa rtially, 
and empathetically considers the agony 
of a human or nonhuman may, 
depending on the circumstances, con­
clude that the agony is instrumentally 
good, but he or she wou Id not, I 
maintain, hesitate to conclude that it 
isint r ins ica IIy ev i I . 4 5 
Callicott has a reply to this sort of 
objection. He defends this implication 
of environmental holism, with two 
arguments. Fi rst he poi nts out that 
pain is necessary for survival: "A 
living mammal which experienced no 
pa in wou Id be one wh ich had a letha I 
dysfu nction of the nervous system. "46 
Pain is also a desirable indicator that 
one has exerted oneself sufficiently to 
be fit. 47 ("No gain without pain! ") 
Thus pain, far from being evil, is 
actually desirable. This argument will 
not do, however. All it shows is that 
pain can be instrumentally good for 
the being who experiences it. More­
over, much of the pain that human 
and nonhuman animals endure is not 
even in strumenta Ily good for those 
individuals. The agony of a bird tor­
tured for sport by a cat is in no way 
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edifying for the bird! Callicott would 
probably answer this reply to his first 
argument with h is second argument. 
He points out that in this world sen­
tient bei ngs do experience frustration, 
anguish, fear, agony, and death. 
"That is the way the system works. 
If nature as a whole is good, then 
pain and death are also good. "48 But 
is that if-clause fulfilled? One can 
have intense admi ration and even awe 
for- the marvelously inter-connected 
complexity of life as it has evolved on 
this planet while at the same time 
wishing that some things were other­
wise. It is fa r from obvious that a 
world in which animals did not have to 
eat each other to su rvive wou Id be 
morally inferior to this one. Thus, 
neither of these arguments meets 
objection (2). 
Moreover, other writings by Calli­
cott suggest that he ought to agree 
that pain is intrinsically evil. Else­
where he argues that the ethical basis 
of Leopold's view can be found in 
Hume's account of the moral senti­
ments. Love and concern for the 
envi ronment as a whole is .said to be 
an exten s ion (not a red i rection) of 
ou r natu ral sympathetic impulses from 
other members of the biotic community 
to the community itself: 
Hume, Da rwi n, and Leopold all 
recognize in addition to social 
sympathies and affections for 
fellow members of society, 
whether tribal, national, or 
biotic, special social sentiments 
the object of which is society 
itself. Patriotism is the name 
of the social sentiment di rected 
to the nation as a superorgan­
ismic entity. Presently there 
is no name for the emergent 
feel i ng, the object of wh ich is 
the biosphere per se and its 
several superorganismic sub­
systems. We cou Id, perhaps, 
call it bio-sentimentality. 49 
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The fact is that those same moral 
sentiments lead one to rega rd the suf­
fering of individuals as intrinsically 
evil. What the quote above suggests 
is that both individuals and biotic 
communities are morally considerable, 
which is contrary to the basic 
assumption of holism. 
At this point, an environmental 
holist could attempt a radical reply to 
the objection that his view has impli­
cations about pain that are unaccepta­
ble from the moral point of view. He 
could choose to reject the moral point 
of view on the ground that it is 
biased in favor of individuals. It 
req u ires us to take into account the 
ways in which individuals would prob­
ably be affected by given actions. We 
are even to empathize with those indi­
viduals who are sentient. It is not 
surprising, he might reply, that 
holism wou Id be rejected from the 
moral point of view! Our considered 
intuitions, .which are based on infor­
mation gained by vivid, empathetic 
awareness, are loaded in favor of 
individuals. 
Callicott does not take this 
approach at all. He explicitly accepts 
the appeal to carefully considered 
moral intuitions. 50 Would he do bet­
ter to reject such an appeal and to 
embrace the radical reply instead? I 
th ink not. The mora I poi nt of view 
advocates nothing. It is the method 
we use to test ethical judgments. To 
take into account the ways in whtch 
individuals are affected or would be 
affected by actions is not to be biased 
in favor of individuals: it is merely 
to be informed about the situation one 
is judging. An environmental holist 
who rejected this method would be 
wide open to the charge that his view 
is uninformed. Finally, in objection 
(5) to environmental individualism, I 
argued that well-considered reflection 
leads to the conclusion that richly 
complex wholes as well as some indi­
viduals have intrinsic value. It is 
then not true to say that th is method 
is necessarily opposed to holistic con­
ceptions of value. Therefore, objec­
tion (2) to envi ronmental hoi ism has 
not been met. We have good reason 
to reject this conception of an envi­
ronmental ethic as it stands. 
F. Conclusion 
I have argued that the homocentric 
eth ic has unacceptable impl ications 
about the treatment of nonhuman ani­
mals and. is an inadequate ethic for 
the use of the environment. Its 
rivals, environmental individualism and 
environmental holism, also have unac­
ceptable implications, but these 
defects can be remedied: each fails in 
so far as it neglects what is right 
about the other. If what I have 
argued is correct, an adequate envi­
ronmental eth ic shou Id incorporate 
both individual istic and hoi istic fea­
tures. What is needed is an ethic 
which accords moral considerability 
(1) to sentient individuals, on the 
9 rounds that they have interests; (2) 
to those naturally occurring individu­
als which have aesthetically valuable 
characteristics; and (3) to those 
rich Iy complex wholes which have 
aesthetically valuable characteristics. 
All that has been said about the cri­
terion of moral significance in the dis­
cussion of environmental individualism 
above holds, but to it must be added 
the class of systems in (3). It will 
sti II be the case that, incases of 
unavoidable conflict, rights-holders 
ought to have priority over beings 
and systems which have no interests. 
I'n cases of confl·icts betweennatu rally 
occurring nonsentient individuals and 
systems wh ich have aesthetic val ue, 
we ought to consider (a) the conse­
quences of proposed actions for the 
significant interests of rights-holders 
and (b) the aesthetic consequences of 
those proposed actions. It will be no 
easy matter to work out such con­
flicts, but, if my reasoning has been 
correct, work them out we must if we 
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are to honor our obligations to the human and nonhuman world. 51 
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